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A Child’s Perspective of Defining a Parent: The Case 
for Intended Parenthood 
 
Linda D. Elrod * 
 
[A] [family] relationship is built on a commitment by the adults to 
live as a family, accompanied by the actuality of family life . . . . 
The relationship that develops between children and those who 
function as their parents . . . ordinarily creates a life-long bond 
between them. 
 
 That bond is not the result of the sexual orientation of the adults 
or of their marital status. It does not arise solely from biology or 
legal adoption.1 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
A child’s sense of belonging begins soon after birth as the child 
learns to rely on caregivers for food, shelter, and love. The child does 
not care how those persons are labeled, only that there is stability and 
continuity in everyday life. The child does not know whether he or 
she was the product of sexual intercourse or assisted reproductive 
technologies (ART), whether he or she was born into a marriage or 
born to unmarried persons. The law, however, cares a great deal 
about these issues because a parent has a fundamental right to make 
decisions regarding the care, custody and control of his or her child;2 
others do not.  A parent not living with the other parent has a right to 
seek parenting time according to the best interests of the child;3 others 
may not have contact with the child without the parent’s permission or 
a court order. A parent may have an obligation to pay child support; 
 
* Richard S. Righter Distinguished Professor of Law and Director of Children and Family Law 
Center, Washburn University School of Law; Editor of the American Bar Association Family 
Law Section’s publication Family Law Quarterly since 1992. Thank you to Dr. Bud Dale and 
Professor Jack Samspon for their comments on my article. 
 1. V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539, 557 (N.J. 2000) (Long, J., concurring), cert. denied 
531 U.S. 926 (2000). 
 2. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000) (“[T]he Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment protects the fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning 
the care, custody, and control of their children.”). 
 3. Linda D. Elrod & Milfred D. Dale, Paradigm Shifts and Pendulum Swings in Child 
Custody: The Interests of Children in the Balance, 42 FAM. L. Q. 381, 384 (2008). 
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others do not. A parent’s rights are not absolute, however, and are 
subject to the State’s exercise of its parens patriae power to protect 
children from harm.4 
Traditionally, defining a parent was relatively easy because there 
were only three avenues to parenthood: giving birth (mater sempe 
certe est),5 being married to the mother of the child (pater est quem 
nuptiae demonstrant),6 or adopting a child.7 At common law, a child 
born out of wedlock suffered numerous disabilities.8 As the number of 
out of wedlock births rose, currently close to 41%,9 through a series 
of opinions, the United States Supreme Court basically eliminated the 
legal discriminations attached to the status of illegitimacy.10 The 
Supreme Court noted: 
 
imposing disabilities on the illegitimate child is contrary to the basic 
concept of our system that legal burdens should bear some 
relationship to individual responsibility or wrongdoing. Obviously, 
no child is responsible for his birth and penalizing the illegitimate 




 4. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166-67 (1944) (recognizing that the state 
could properly intrude on that “private realm of family life” to protect child from harm); Parham 
v. J.R, 442 U.S. 584, 603 (1979) (noting that “a state is not without constitutional control over 
parental discretion in dealing with children when their physical or mental health is 
jeopardized.”). See also Kulstad v. Maniaci, 220 P.3d 595, 604 (Mont. 2009) (stating that the 
“parent’s constitutionally protected interest in parental control . . . should yield to the best 
interests of the child ‘when the parent’s conduct is contrary to the child-parent relationship.’” 
 5. Nguyen v. I.N.S., 533 U.S. 53, 62 (2001) (stating that the [parentage of a mother] 
“is verifiable from the birth itself.”). 
 6. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES 455 (1765) (“The main end and design of 
marriage [is] to ascertain and fix upon some certain person, to whom the care, the protection, 
the maintenance, and the education of the children should belong.”). The common law 
presumption of legitimacy did not apply if the father was sterile, impotent, or beyond the four 
seas. Id. at 457. 
 7. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, HOUSEHOLDS BY TYPE: 2000, Table 1, fn 2 (noting 
that for computational purposes “family members include only people related to the family 
householder by birth, marriage or adoption.”). 
 8. See generally HARRY D. KRAUSE, ILLEGITIMACY: LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY (1971). 
 9. See Joyce A. Martin, et al., Births: Final Data for 2008, 59 (1) NAT. VITAL STAT. 
REP. 1 (Dec. 2010). Between 1970 and 2004, the proportion of nonmarital births increased from 
10.7 to 35.8 percent. HARRY D. KRAUSE, ET AL., FAMILY LAW 308 (6th ed. 2007) (citing 
national health statistics for 2004). 
 10. See Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968) (noting past treatment of children born 
out of wedlock and finding these children to be “persons” within the meaning of the Equal 
Protection Clause); Glona v. Am. Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968). 
 11. Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175-76 (1972) (holding that the 
Equal Protection Clause prohibits discriminatory laws related to status of birth absent a legitimate 
state interest). 
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The Supreme Court also found that children are entitled to financial 
support from their father, whether he is married to the mother or 
not.12 As unwed fathers demanded, and received, the opportunity to 
establish a parental relationship with their child,13 presumptions of 
legitimacy based on marriage gave way to presumptions of parentage 
based also on genetic testing and voluntary acknowledgments.14 
In 2006, over 41,000 children were born through assisted 
reproductive technologies (ART);15 many to same-sex couples.16 There 
is every reason to believe this number is greater today. If the parents 
are married, laws protect the rights of these children by declaring that 
the husband who consents to the artificial insemination of his wife is 
the legal father of the child.17 Legislatures have done little to protect a 
 
 12. Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973) (finding father of child born out of wedlock 
had legal obligation to pay child support). Since 1974, Congress has taken steps to facilitate the 
establishment of parentage for non-marital children. The Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996) imposed 
on the states a range of requirements aimed at early paternity establishment, including voluntary 
acknowledgments of paternity, early genetic testing, and limitations on rebuttal of presumptions 
of paternity to improve child support establishment and collections. See Laura W. Morgan, Child 
Support Fifty Years Later, 42 FAM. L. Q. 365 (2008) (discussing child support and paternity 
establishment and disestablishment). 
 13. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (requiring due process hearing before 
removing children from unwed father when mother died). See also Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 
248 (1983) (denying unwed father standing because he did not follow state law requirement to 
file in putative father registry); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979) (allowing unwed 
father who had lived with and maintained relationship with children to veto adoption by 
stepparent); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978) (denying unwed father the right to veto 
stepparent adoption where he had little contact over many years). 
 14. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 4(a) 9B U.L.A. 393-94 (1973) [hereinafter UNIF. 
PARENTAGE ACT (1973)]; UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT §§ 204, 301, 9B U.L.A. 311 (2000), as 
amended 2002 (2001 & West Supp. 2010) [hereinafter UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2000)]. For a 
discussion of the differences in the 1973, 2000 and 2002 amendment versions, see generally 
UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT (2000) (with Unofficial Annotations by John J. Sampson, Reporter), 
35 Fam. L. Q. 83 (2001) and John J. Sampson, Preface to the Amendments to the Uniform 
Parentage Act (2002), 37 Fam. L. Q. 1 (2003). 
 15. Centers for Disease Control, Assisted Reproductive Technology (ART) Success Rates: 
National Summary and Fertility Clinic Reports: 2006 ART Report (indicating there were 
138,198 ART cycles performed at 483 fertility clinics in 2006, resulting in 41,343 live births). 
 16. Of the 770,000 same-sex couples, more than twenty percent are raising children. The 
Williams Institute, Census Snapshot: United States (Dec. 2007), available at 
http://www.law.ucla.edu/williamsinstitute/publications/USCensusSnapshot.pdf. See also Courtney 
G. Joslin, Interstate Recognition of Parentage in a Time of Disharmony: Same-Sex Parent 
Families and Beyond, 70 OHIO ST. L. J. 563, 591 n. 153-55 (2009). 
 17. See e.g. ALA. CODE §  26-17-21; ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 25-501(B); ARK. CODE ANN. § 
28-9-209; CAL. FAM. CODE § 7613 (2009); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-4-107; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 
13, § 8-101 et seq.; FLA. STAT. §§ 742.11-14; IDAHO CODE § 39-5401 et seq.; ILL. COMP. 
STAT. 40/2; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-128 (2007); KY. REV. STAT. § 213.046; LA. CIV. CODE 
ANN. ART. 188; MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW  §1-206; MASS. GEN. LAWS Ch. 46, § 4B; MICH. 
COMP. LAWS § 333.2824; MINN. STAT. § 257.56; MO. REV. STAT. §193.085; MONT. CODE 
ANN. § 40-6-101 et seq.; NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-1412.01(3); NEV. REV. STAT.§ 126.061; N.J. 
STAT. ANN. § 9:17-44; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-11-6; N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 73; N.C. GEN. 
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child conceived through use of ART, however, especially by same-sex 
partners. In many states the child has only one legal parent.18 The 
child, however, has the same bonding, emotional development and 
financial needs as any other child. In addition to possibly losing the 
primary caregiver, the child may be denied child support, inheritance, 
worker’s compensation, or other government benefits for which the 
child would be eligible from the other “parent.”19 
The United States Supreme Court has recognized the rights of 
adults to maintain family relationships in both traditional and 
nontraditional families.20 The child, as a part of the family, should 
also have the right to maintain family relationships. The Supreme 
Court has not yet decided “whether a child has a liberty interest, 
symmetrical with that of her parent” in maintaining filial 
relationships.21 Justice Stevens in his dissent in Troxel, hinted at this 
by saying: 
 
While this court has not yet had occasion to elucidate the nature of a 
child’s liberty interests in preserving established familial or family-
like bonds, it seems to me extremely likely that, to the extent parents 
and families have fundamental liberty interests in preserving such 
intimate relationships, so, too, do children have these interests, and 
so too, must their interests be balanced in the equation.22 
 
This article starts by briefly reviewing attachment theory as it 
relates to the importance of maintaining continuity and stability in 
 
STAT. § 49A-1; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3111.95; OKLA. STAT. TIT. 10, § 551-553; OR. REV. 
STAT. § 109.239; TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-3-306; TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.201; UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 78B-15-702; VA. CODE ANN. § 20-49-10; WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.705; WIS. STAT. § 
69.14(H); WYO. STAT. § 14-2-902. 
 18. See Kazmierazak v. Query, 736 So. 2d 106 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999); Alison D. v. 
Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27 (N.Y. 1991); Titchenal v. Dexter, 693 A.2d 682, 686 (Vt. 1997); 
In re C.B. L., 723 N.E.2d 316 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999); McGuffin v. Overton, 542 N.W.2d 288 
(Mich. Ct. App. 1995); White v. White, 293 S.W.3d 1 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009), rev. denied; 
White v. Thompson, 11 S.W.3d 913, 919 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999). 
 19. In re M.M.D., 662 A.2d 837, 857-59 & nn. 43-48 (D.C. Ct. App. 1995) (noting that 
a child having two legal parents rather than one created substantial benefits). See also Goodridge 
v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 964 (Mass. 2003) (noting that exclusion of same-sex 
couples from marriage directly disadvantaged the children by denying the families of benefits). 
 20. Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 505-06 (1977) (finding that a 
grandmother and her two grandsons from different fathers had a right to live as a family; 
grandmother as custodian of one grandson possessed the rights of a parent). 
 21. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 130 (1989). 
 22. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 88 (Stevens, J. dissenting). See also Elk Grove 
Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 15 (2004) (noting while the father had an interest in 
inculcating his child with his views on religion, the mother also had rights and that “most 
important, it implicates the interests of a young child who finds herself at the center of a highly 
public debate . . . .”). 
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parent-child relationships. The next part looks at the increasing use of 
assisted reproductive technologies to produce children and explores the 
ways legislatures and courts have struggled to define the term 
“parent.” A review of cases illustrates that some courts are broadly 
interpreting their statutes or fashioning a variety of equitable remedies 
to protect the child’s relationship with a nonbiological intentional 
parent. 
The article concludes that in the absence of specific legislation, the 
state should use its role as parens patriae to protect children from 
harm by preventing disruption of existing intentionally-created parental 
relationships.  The time has come for legislatures and courts to 
recognize a new category of parent – the intended parent. Especially 
when a child results from the use of assisted reproductive 
technologies, the best interest of the child requires the law to create 
nonmodifiable parental rights to protect the emotional reality of the 
child, preserve the child’s attachment bonds, and ensure that the child 
receives adequate financial support. 
 
II.  BRIEF REVIEW OF ATTACHMENT LITERATURE 
 
Unlike adults, children have no psychological conception of 
relationship by blood tie until quite late in their development.23 
 
Forty years of social science research shows that children form 
significant “attachment” relationships to parental figures early in life 
and these bonds are essential to the child’s well being and 
development.24 Attachment bonds are the “reciprocal, emotional, and 
physical affiliation between a child and a caregiver.”25 These bonds 
develop through the provision of physical and emotional care, 
continuity or consistency in the child’s life and emotional investment 
in the child.26 Attachment relationships have profound neurological 
 
 23. JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN, ANNA FREUD & ALBERT J. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST 
INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 12-13 (1973). 
 24. For a general discussion of attachment theory, see JOHN BOWLBY, ATTACHMENT 177, 
265-68 (2d ed. 1982); MELVIN KONNER, CHILDHOOD 84-87 (1982); HANDBOOK OF 
ATTACHMENT: THEORY, RESEARCH AND CLINICAL APPLICATIONS (JUDE CASSIDY & PHILLIP R. 
SHAVER, EDS. 1990). See also Ana H. Marty et al., Supporting Secure Parent-Child 
Attachments: The Role of the Non-Parental Caregiver, 175 EARLY CHILD DEVELOPMENT & 
CARE 271, 274 (2005) (stating that the child’s social adjustment is affected by the quality of 
attachment). 
 25. BEVERLY JAMES, HANDBOOK FOR TREATMENT OF ATTACHMENT - TRAUMA 
PROBLEMS IN CHILDREN 2 (1994). 
 26. NAT’L RES. COUNCIL & INST. OF MED., FROM NEURONS TO NEIGHBORHOODS: THE 
SCIENCE OF EARLY CHILDHOOD DEVELOPMENT 234 (Jack P. Shonkoff & Deborah A. Phillips 
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effects which are among the major environmental factors shaping a 
child’s brain.27 Secure attachment leads to the “development of 
awareness, social competence, conscience, emotional growth and 
emotional regulation.”28 These attachment bonds serve to protect the 
child’s development, forming the building blocks for the emerging 
sense of emotional security, the ability to cope with stress, and an 
increased self awareness.29 
Children form strong attachment bonds to parental figures and can 
form attachments to more than one person. A child develops an 
attachment relationship with the person who on a day-to-day basis 
“fulfills the child’s psychological needs for a parent, as well as the 
child’s physical needs.”30 The quality and nature of the interaction of 
the parent and child creates the attachment, not the legal designation 
of parent, not the parent’s marital status, and not the parent’s sexual 
orientation.31 The lack of a legally protected relationship for the 
nonbiological partner and the child conceived by artificial insemination 
(or adopted by only one of the partners) and reared by both may 
impair the initial attachment.32 
Continuity of the parent-child relationship is essential to the child’s 
overall well-being. When an attachment relationship is severed by one 
 
eds. 2000) [hereinafter FROM NEURONS TO NEIGHBORHOODS]. 
 27. DANIEL J. SIEGEL, THE DEVELOPING MIND: TOWARD A NEUROBIOLOGY OF 
INTERPERSONAL EXPERIENCE 67-68, 81-87, 116-20 (1999). See also Am. Acad. of Pediatrics, 
Comm. on Early Childhood, Adoption, and Dependent Care, Developmental Issues for Young 
Children in Foster Care, 106 PEDIATRICS 1145 (2000) (noting that “[E]motional and cognitive 
disruptions in the early lives of children have the potential to impair brain development.”). 
 28. FROM NEURONS TO NEIGHBORHOODS, supra note 26, at 226, 265. 
 29. Id. at 226. See also James G. Byrne, et al., Practitioner Review: The Contribution of 
Attachment Theory to Child Custody Assessments, 46 J. CHILD PSYCHOL. & PSYCHIATRY 115, 
118 (2005). 
 30. GOLDSTEIN, FREUD & SOLNIT, supra note 23, at 98. 
 31. Barbara M. McCandlish, Against All Odds: Lesbian Mother Family Dynamics, in 
GAY AND LESBIAN FAMILIES 30-31 (Frederick W. Bozett, ed., 1987) (reporting that when both 
partners care for a child, the child becomes attached to both); Am. Acad. of Pediatrics, Family 
Pediatrics: Report of the Task Force on the Family, 111 PEDIATRICS 1541, 1550 (2003) 
(reporting that parental sexual orientation has no measureable effect on the quality of parent-child 
relationships); Amer. Acad. of Pediatrics, U.S. National Longitudinal Lesbian Family Study: 
Psychological Adjustment of 17-Year Old Adolescents, 126 PEDIATRICS 1 (2010) [hereinafter 
Longitudinal Lesbian Family Study] (noting that children’s optimal development seems to be 
influenced more by the nature of the relationships and interactions within the family unit than by 
the particular structural form it takes). See also Raymond W. Chan, et al., Psychological 
Adjustment Among Children Conceived by Donor Insemination By Lesbian and Heterosexual 
Mothers 69 CHILD DEV. 443, 454 (1998) (indicating that children’s well-being is more a 
function of parenting and relationship process than household composition). 
 32. See David D. Meyer, Family Ties: Solving the Constitutional Dilemma of the 
Faultless Father, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 752, 798-803 (1999) (discussing literature showing the 
quality of bonding can be impaired when there is substantial legal insecurity in the relationship 
between children and their adult caregivers). 
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parent dropping out of a child’s life, the child suffers emotional and 
psychological harm. Disrupting attachments can turn a securely 
attached child into an insecure one.33 Harm can occur to any child if 
one parent suddenly refuses to allow the other to maintain contact with 
a child. When a legally recognized parent is denied contact, there are 
legal remedies. But if the nonbiological partner lacks legal standing, 
the harm to the child can be irreparable because there may be no 
remedy to allow the child to maintain the relationship.34 A Texas 
judge noted: “The destruction of the parent-child relationship is a 
traumatic experience that can lead to emotional devastation for all the 
parties involved. . . .”35 
Children benefit from having two parents for emotional and 
financial support. The American Law Institute’s Principles of the Law 
of Family Dissolution state that the best interest of the child is served 
by the “continuity of existing parent-child attachments; meaningful 
contact between the child and each parent; caretaking relationships by 
adults who love the child, know how to provide for the child’s needs 
and place a high priority on doing so.”36 A growing body of research 
indicates that children reared in same-sex relationships appear to 
develop the same as other children.37 Therefore, protecting the child’s 
 
 33. VIRGINIA L. COLIN, HUMAN ATTACHMENT 96-97 (1996) (noting that children 
manifest anxiety and insecurity when impaired bonding); WILLIAM F. HODGES, INTERVENTIONS 
FOR CHILDREN OF DIVORCE: CUSTODY, ACCESS, AND PSYCHOTHERAPY 8 (2d ed. 1991) 
(indicating that children assume they can depend on both parents and when that assumption 
proves incorrect, they then doubt whether they can count on any parent); Frank J. Dyer, 
Termination of Parental Rights in Light of Attachment Theory: The Case of Kaylee, 10 
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 5, 11 (2004) (citing numerous empirical findings that provide a 
basis for predicting long term harm associated with disrupted attachment relationships); Joan B. 
Kelly & Michael E. Lamb, Using Child Development Research to Make Appropriate Custody 
and Access Decisions for Young Children, 38 FAM. & CONCIL. CTS. REV. 297, 303 (2000) 
(noting that substantial literature documents the adverse effects of disrupted parent-child 
relationships on children’s development and adjustment). 
 34. Nancy D. Polikoff, Lesbian and Gay Parenting: The Last Thirty Years, 66 MONT. L. 
REV. 51, 53 (2005) (noting that “children have been harmed by losing a relationship with their 
legally unrecognized parent.”). See also FIONA L. TASKER & SUSAN GOLOMBOK, GROWING UP 
IN A LESBIAN FAMILY: EFFECTS ON CHILD DEVELOPMENT 12 (Guilford Press 1997) (reporting 
that cessation of parent-child bond between a child and a lesbian psychological parent causes 
harm); Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining Parenthood to Meet 
the Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other Non-traditional Families, 78 GEO. L. J. 459, 
473 (1990) (stating that ignoring the relationship between children and functional parents is not 
in the best interests of children in nontraditional homes). 
 35. Goodson v. Castellanos, 214 S.W.3d 741, 749 (Tex. App. 2007), rehearing overruled 
(2007), review denied (2008). 
 36. ALI PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS §2.02(1)(b)-(d) (2002) [hereinafter ALI PRINCIPLES]. 
 37. See Longitudinal Lesbian Family Study, supra note 31, at 5-6 (finding that children 
raised by lesbian parents demonstrated higher levels of social, academic and total competence, 
and lower levels of rule breaking and aggressive behavior than gender matched samples of other 
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attachments with both parents, even if the parents are unmarried or of 
the same sex, will usually be in the best interests of the child and 
society. As the United States Supreme Court explained: 
 
[T]he importance of the familial relationship, to the individuals 
involved and to the society, stems from the emotional attachments 
that derive from the intimacy of daily association, and from the role 
it plays in “promot[ing] a way of life” through the instruction of 
children . . . as well as from the fact of blood relationship.38 
 
III.  DEFINING A PARENT USING ART 
 
The traditional concept of family as based on genetics is directly 
challenged by assisted reproduction emphasis on choice of offspring 
whether genetically related or not. . . .39 
 
Assisted reproductive technology allows for the creation of a child 
by methods other than heterosexual intercourse, including gamete 
(sperm or egg) donation, intrauterine insemination, in vitro 
fertilization (IVF), and surrogacy.40 To date, there has been relatively 
little federal or state regulation of assisted reproduction,41 so courts 
have struggled to define who is a parent. The sole aim of ART is to 
produce a child, so parenthood is “intentional” rather than 
happenstance. ART may be used to overcome fertility problems of one 
of the parties42 or a woman’s age limitations.43 ART also enables 
 
teenagers); William Meezan & Jonathan Rauch, Gay Marriage, Same-Sex Parenting, and 
America’s Children, 15(2) THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN: MARRIAGE AND CHILD WELL-BEING 97, 
108 (2005) (indicating that same-sex marriage might benefit children in the durability and 
stability of parental relationships); Charlotte Patterson, Children of Lesbian and Gay Parents, 
15(5) CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOL. SCI. 241-44 (2006) (reviewing current social science 
research on well-being of children in same-sex families). See also Kulstad v. Maniaci, 220 P.3d 
595, 601 (Mont. 2009) (noting “Children of same-sex parents fare just as well as their peers 
physically, psychologically, emotionally, cognitively, and socially.”). 
 38. Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equal. and Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 844 (1977). 
 39. CHARLES KINDREGAN & MAUREEN MCBRIEN, ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE 
TECHNOLOGY: A LAWYER’S GUIDE TO EMERGING LAW AND SCIENCE, 2 (2d ed. 2010) 
[hereinafter ART: A LAWYER’S GUIDE]. 
40. See The Society for Assisted Reproductive Technology (SART) website, at 
http://www.sart.org/detail.aspx?id=1903. 
41.  The American Bar Association House of Delegates approved a Model Act Governing 
Assisted Reproductive Technology which is considered a first step toward legal recognition and 
regulation of ART. See Charles P. Kindregan, Jr. & Steven H. Snyder, Clarifying the Law of 
ART: The New American Bar Association Model Act Governing Assisted Reproductive 
Technology, 42 Fam. L. Q. 203 (2008). 
 42. Estimates are that 7.3 million women of reproductive age have some sort of infertility 
that prevents them from having children without medical intervention. See Center for Disease 
Control, National Center for Health Statistics, http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/fertile.htm 
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same-sex couples to procreate, sometimes using the genetic material 
from both partners.44 Because a child may be created by using 
anonymously contributed sperm, an anonymous donor egg or a 
mixture of two eggs and different sperm donors, and gestated by a 
third person, there may be more than “two” parents.45 In this “brave 
new world” of technologically-produced children, adhering to the 
traditional definition of a parent can harm the child by not recognizing 
as parents those persons whose intentions, and sometimes one of the 
person’s genetic material, produced the child. 
 
A.  ART and the Married Woman - Presumption of Legitimacy 
 
At common law and by statute, the man married to the mother is 
presumed to be the father of the child.46 Most states have extended the 
presumption of legitimacy by enacting statutes to provide that a child 
born of artificial insemination with the consent of the husband and 
wife is the husband’s legal child, irrespective of biology.47 In the six 
jurisdictions that allow same-sex marriage,48 the presumption of 
legitimacy or parentage statutes arguably apply. The presumption 
should also apply in states which offer civil unions and domestic 
partnerships that give the partners the same status as married 
couples.49 When a same-sex couple enters into a valid civil union and 
 
 43. See J.F. v. D.B., 897 A.2d 1261 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006) (using gestational carrier with 
father’s sperm because his female partner who was a widow with grown children and 
grandchildren and fertility treatments failed); In re C.K.G., 173 S.W.3d 714 (Tenn. 2005) 
(noting gestational mother used donated eggs because she was forty-five and doubted the viability 
of her own eggs). 
 44. K.M. v. E.G., 117 P.3d 673 (Cal. 2006) (finding both women parents when one 
provided her eggs for her female partner’s IVF). 
 45. See In re Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280 (Ct. App. 1998) (holding that the husband 
and wife who intended to create the child were the legal parents); Jacob v. Schultz-Jacob, 923 
A.2d 473 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007) (finding that a child could have three parents, the lesbian couple 
and sperm donor); Raftopol v. Ramey, 12 A.3d 783 (Conn. 2011) (allowing both male partners 
to be listed as parents when they used a gestational surrogate to have a child). 
 46. See Goodright v. Moss, 98 Eng. Rep. 1257, 1258 (K.B. 1777) (stating that “decency, 
morality, and policy” required the law to be that a couple, after the birth of a child in wedlock, 
would not be heard to say that they have no connection and their offspring was spurious). 
 47. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (1973) § 5 (providing “[i]f, under the supervision of a 
licensed physician and with the consent of her husband, a wife is inseminated artificially with 
semen donated by a man not her husband, the husband is treated in law as if he were the natural 
father of a child thereby conceived.”). See supra note 17 for listing of statutes. 
 48. D.C. CODE § 46-401(a) (2009); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 457:1-a (West 2010); VT. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 15 .§ 8 (2009); Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 
2008); Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009); Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 
N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). 
 49. NEV. REV. STAT. § 122A.200 (2010) (stating “[d]omestic partners have the same 
rights, protections and benefits, and are subject to the same responsibilities, obligations and 
254 BYU JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW [Volume 25 
 
that status permits a parentage order, courts have held that the order is 
entitled to full faith and credit.50 A parentage relationship should be 
recognized in other states even if the Defense of Marriage Act denies 
legal recognition of the marriage or civil union.51 Because the 
Supreme Court has struck down state laws discriminating against 
children, the child’s status should not depend on whether the parents 
are married or in a civil union. 
The UPA 2000 includes specific provisions for reproductive 
technology. When couples use ART, either Article 7 dealing with a 
child of assisted conception or Article 8 dealing with gestational 
agreements, the parent-child relationship may be created with or 
without judicial intervention depending on the procedure. If a married 
woman gives birth by ART, her husband may not challenge his 
paternity unless he brings a paternity suit within two years of the 
child’s birth and the courts finds that he did not consent to ART 
before or after the birth.52 When a man and woman use ART with the 
intent to become parents, they both must consent in a written record.53 
Surrogacy involves a woman agreeing to serve as the birth mother 
to have a child for another person or couple whether or not she is the 
genetic mother.54 In a few states, when using gestational surrogacy, 
 
duties under law, whether derived from statutes, administrative regulations, court rules, 
government policies, common law or any other provisions or sources of law, as are granted to 
and imposed upon spouses.”). See also CAL. FAM. CODE § 297.5; HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 572C-
1-7; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 103; OR. REV. STAT. 11§ 106 (2009); WASH.REV.CODE § 26.60.010 – 
901 (2009); WIS. STAT, 770.01-15 (2009). 
 50. See Debra H. v. Janice R., 930 N.E.2d 184 (N.Y. 2010); Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-
Jenkins, 637 S.E.2d 330 (Va. Ct. App. 2006). The Attorneys General of both Maryland and 
Rhode Island have indicated their states would recognize same-sex marriages valid in other 
jurisdictions. 
 51. 1 U.S.C. § 7 and 28 U.S.C.§ 1738C. The Defense of Marriage Act has been found 
unconstitutional in two federal court cases.  See Gill v. Office of Personnel Management, 699 F. 
Supp. 2d 374 (D. Mass. 2010); Mass. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 698 F. Supp. 
2d 234 (D. Mass. 2010). 
 52. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2000) § 705(a) (allowing a court to adjudicate paternity at 
any time if it is found that he did not provide sperm or consent, he and the mother have not 
cohabited since the probable time for the ART, and the husband never treated the child as his 
own). 
 53. Id. at § 704(a) (stating that failure of the man to sign does not preclude paternity 
finding if he lives with child for two years and holds child out as his own). Id. at § 704(b). 
When a child is conceived by ART with eggs, sperm or embryo implanted after divorce, the 
former husband is not a parent unless he consented in a written record. Id. at § 706(a). 
 54. ART: A LAWYER’S GUIDE, supra note 39, at 151. In traditional surrogacy, a woman 
is artificially inseminated with the sperm of a man who is not her husband. The wife often is 
infertile or unable to carry a child. See In re Baby M., 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988) (recognizing 
the parental rights of the surrogate, genetic mother). In gestational surrogacy, the woman carries 
an embryo created from gametes of others for intended parents. Because the surrogate is not 
biologically related to the child, gestational surrogacy agreements are more likely to be 
enforceable. See Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993); R.R. v. M.J., 689 N.E.2d 790 
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the intended parents are the legal parents.55 Five states explicitly 
prohibit surrogacy.56 About twenty-two expressly or impliedly permit 
the enforcement of some type of surrogacy contract; the remaining 
twenty-four states have no statutes or case law.57 
The UPA 2000 creates a mechanism for recognizing a written 
agreement between the gestational mother, her husband if she is 
married, the donor or donors, and the intended parents.58 The 
agreement provides for the intended parents to be the legal parents of 
the child, with the others relinquishing their rights.59 The court may 
approve the agreement if the parties are residents, the agreement is 
voluntary, and meets other requirements.60 If a gestational agreement 
is invalid, the gestational mother is the mother and her husband is the 
father if she is married. If not, the sperm donor, if known, is the 
father.61 
One recent case dealt with surrogacy in the context of same-sex 
male partners. The Connecticut Supreme Court granted a declaratory 
judgment that a biological father and his same-sex domestic partner 
were the legal parents of a child being carried by a surrogate mother 
with eggs recovered from a third party donor and fertilized with sperm 
contributed by one of the partners. The court found that intended 
parents who are parties to a valid gestational agreement acquire 
parental status and are entitled to be named as parents on the 
replacement birth certificate, without respect to their biological 
relationship to the child.62 
 
 
(Mass. 1998). The UPA drafters rejected use of the term “surrogacy agreement” in favor of 
gestational agreement. 
 55. ILL. COMP. STAT. 47/15 (2010); N.D. CENT. CODE §14-18-05, at 7 (2009). 
 56. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 25-218(B) (2010); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-20-1-1(1)-(8) 
(2009); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.855 (2010); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-21, 200 (2010); 
N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 122 (2009); In re Baby M., 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988) (finding a 
surrogacy for hire arrangement unenforceable because it was too close to baby selling). But see 
J.R. v. Utah, 261 F. Supp. 2d 1268 (D. Utah 2002) (finding that statute denying effect to 
surrogacy contracts violated the fundamental rights of those who wish to procreate using 
gestational surrogacy). 
 57. ART: A LAWYER’S GUIDE, supra note 39, at 157-58. 
 58. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2000) § 801. 
 59. Id. at § 801(a)(2), (3). 
 60. Id. at § 802, 803. 
 61. Id. at § 809. 
 62. Raftopol v. Ramey, 12 A.3d 783 (Conn. 2011). 
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B.  ART and Single Woman 
 
When a single woman uses ART, there is clearly a birth mother, 
but not an identified father. The Uniform Parentage Act (2000), as 
amended in 2002, provides that a man who provides sperm for use by 
someone other than his wife with no intent to become a parent is a 
“donor” and not a legal parent whether the donor was known to the 
mother or not.63 Some states have allowed a known sperm donor to 
have legal rights and responsibilities.64 Others find that the donor of 
sperm is not the father unless there is a written agreement to the 
contrary.65 This latter view seems wrong, as outside of the ART 
context, no laws grant a parent the right to be a sole parent. The child 
created by ART should be treated as any other child and allowed to 
benefit from having two parents.66 
Few states have specific legislation covering same sex partners 
who wish to be listed as co-parents. Before enacting a same-sex 
marriage law in December, 2009, the District of Columbia had 
enacted the Domestic Partnership Judicial Determination of Parentage 
Amendment Act. That law granted legal parentage to the spouse or 
unmarried partner who consents to the child being conceived using 
artificial insemination.67 Other states have tried to work with existing 
statutes. For example, Oregon interpreted its statute that provides that 
a man who consents to his wife’s insemination is a parent to apply to 
a female same-sex partner of the woman inseminated.68 
   
 
 63. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 702 (2000). Alabama, Delaware, New Mexico, North 
Dakota, Oklahoma, Texas, Utah, Washington and Wyoming have enacted the UNIF. PARENTAGE 
ACT (2000), as amended 2002. 
 64. C.M. v. C.C., 407 A.2d 849 (N.J. Juv. & Dom. Ct. 1979); Jhordan C. V. Mary K., 
224 Cal. Rptr. 2d 530 (Ct. App. 1986); LaChapelle v. Mitten, 607 N.W.2d 151 (Minn. 2000); 
In re Sullivan, 157 S.W.3d 911 (Tex. App. 2005). 
 65. In re K.M.H., 169 P.3d 1025 (Kan. 2007); Ferguson v. McKiernan, 940 A.2d 1256 
(Pa. 2007). 
 66. Marsha Garrison, Law Making for Baby Making: An Interpretative Approach to the 
Determination of Legal Parentage, 113 HARV. L. REV. 835 (2000). 
 67. D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-909(a-1) (according a presumption of parentage for the female 
partner of a woman giving birth). 
 68. Shineovich v. Kemp, 214 P.3d 29, 40 (Or. Ct. App. 2009). See also Raftopol v. 
Ramey, 12 A.3d 783 (Conn. 2011) (allowing both male partners to be listed as parents when 
they used a gestational surrogate to have a child.); In re Parentage of Robinson, 890 A.2d 1036, 
1042 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2005) (same). 
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C.  The Uniform Parentage Act 
 
Several states have adopted the Uniform Parentage Act (UPA), 
either the 1973 or the revised 2000, amended in 2002, version.69 The 
1973 Prefatory Note states that the purpose is to provide for 
substantive legal equality for all children regardless of the marital 
status of their parents.70 Although the UPA seeks to ensure that a child 
has two parents, it is flexible enough that it can be interpreted to 
establish parenthood by a single parent, a heterosexual couple, or a 
same-sex couple. 
Both the original and updated versions of the UPA have provisions 
relating to presumptions of parentage. Maternity is presumed from 
giving birth.71 The 1973 version allows any interested party to bring 
an action to determine the existence of a father and child relationship. 
A man is presumed to be the natural father of a child among other 
things if he married or attempted to marry the mother or if he 
“receives the child into his home and openly holds out the child as his 
natural child. . . .”72 When presumptions conflict, the 1973 UPA 
provides that the “presumption which on the facts is founded on 
weightier considerations of policy and logic controls.”73 The Rhode 
Island Supreme Court, using its paternity statute which follows the 
UPA language, found that the partner was an “interested party” 
because she had functioned as a parent, even though she was not 
biologically related to the child.74 The partner was “involved with” the 
child’s paternity because the partners jointly planned to bear and raise 
the child, she helped arrange and pay for the insemination procedure, 
and the child’s last name was a hyphenated version of both their 
 
 69. For a listing of states, see Uniform Law Commission, 
http:www.uniformlaws.org/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title=Parentage. 
 70. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (1973) Prefatory Note and § 2. See In re Marriage of Ross, 
682 P.2d 331, 338 (Kan. 1989). 
 71. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (1973) § 3(1). 
 72. Id. at § 4(a)(4). See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1114(a)(4) (Supp. 2010) (providing 
presumption of parentage if man “notoriously or in writing recognizes paternity of the 
child . . . .”). 
 73. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 4(b). See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1114(c) (Supp. 2010) 
(adding the best interest of the child as a consideration). 
 74. Rubano v. DiCenzo, 759 A.2d 959, 966-67 (R.I. 2000). The court also found that the 
partner’s claim for visitation fell within “matters relating to adults who shall be involved with 
paternity of children born out of wedlock” and noted, “We are mindful of the Legislature’s 
instruction that when statutes are construed ‘every word importing the masculine gender only, 
may be construed to extend to and to include females as well as males.’ . . . Thus, two women 
may certainly be ‘adults who shall be involved with paternity’ of a child for purposes of this 
statute.” Id. at 970. 
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surnames.75 
The California Supreme Court held that the same sex partner of 
the biological mother is a presumed parent under the California 
Parentage Act if she receives a child into her home and holds the child 
out as her own.76 Having previously recognized that a child could 
have two mothers,77 the court interpreted the provision that a man is 
presumed to be the natural father if he lives with the child and openly 
holds the child out as his own as applying equally to women.78 
The donor of either eggs or sperm is not a parent and has no legal 
rights or obligations of parenthood.79 When a woman uses ART and a 
man provides sperm or consents to use of another’s sperm with the 
intent that he be the parent, he is the legal father.80 In a California 
case, the court used the provision of the UPA using genetic 
consanguinity where one partner donated the egg to her partner for in 
vitro fertilization.81 
Not all courts are willing to use an expansive interpretation of the 
UPA.82 The Wisconsin court recently stated, “[f]or obvious reasons, a 
same sex partner . . . can never receive the presumption of 
parenthood.”83 To adequately protect children, the UPA should be 
amended to specifically create a presumption of parentage in the case 
of intended parents using assisted reproductive technologies. Perhaps 
 
 75. Id. at 971. 
 76. Elisa B. v. Superior Ct., 117 P.3d 660, 664-65 (Cal. 2005) (finding that the non-
biological mother of twins born to her partner during the relationship was a legal parent with the 
obligation to pay child support). 
 77. Id. at 666, discussing Sharon S. v. Superior Court, 73 P.3d 554 (Cal. 2003). 
 78. Id. at 667.  The California court had previously determined that biology is not 
essential for a man to be a natural father when he married the pregnant mother and assumed the 
role of parent. In re Nicholas H., 46 P.3d 932, 934 (Cal. 2002) (noting that “[t]his social 
relationship is much more important, to the child at least, than a biological relationship of actual 
paternity.”); Charisma R. v. Kristina, 96 Cal. Rptr. 3d 26 (Ct. App. 2009) (granting partner 
standing even when the partners were only together for four months after the birth of the child). 
See also Smith v. Gordon, 968 A.2d 1, 6-7 (Del. 2009) (finding that there was nothing 
impractical about allowing a woman to satisfy either the notorious acknowledgment or writing 
requirements of the Uniform Parentage Act, but that the partner did not meet the requirements). 
 79. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2000) § 702. 
 80. Id. at § 703. 
 81. K.M. v. E.G., 117 P.3d 673 (Cal. 2005). 
 82. See Chatterjee v. King, --- P.3d ----, 2010 WL 5783011 (N.M. Ct. App. Dec. 1, 
2010) (finding that nothing in the paternity “statute indicates that the Legislature contemplated a 
parent and child relationship being established between a natural mother and a child with regard 
to anyone other than a natural mother”); In re Paternity of Christian R.H., 2010 WL 5158629 
(Wis. Ct. App. Dec. 21, 2010) (finding that a same-sex partner can never receive a presumption 
of parentage under the Parentage Act). See also In re Parentage of L.B., 122 P.3d 161, 166 
(Wash. 2005) (noting that the Uniform Parentage Act “did not contemplate nor address every 
conceivable family constellation” but granting equitable relief). 
 83. In re Paternity of Christian, 2011 WI App 2, ¶ 10 (Wis. Dec. 21, 2010). 
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an easier way to amend the UPA would be to change the term 
“paternity” to “parentage” and change the terms “husband” and 
“wife” to “parent partners.” Any of these amendments would allow 
courts to interpret the UPA to benefit children by recognizing both 
parents—the biological and legal or intended. 
 
D.  Adoption 
 
A parent-child relationship can be created by adoption. Adoption 
is statutory and did not exist at common law, resulting in some states 
construing adoption statutes strictly. The birth parents must relinquish 
their rights or have them terminated before an adoption can create 
legal rights in another person. Most states make an exception for a 
stepparent adoption in which only one parent’s rights are terminated 
and the other legal parent remains. Several courts have extended the 
rationale underlying a stepparent adoption to allow a same-sex partner 
to adopt because it is in the child’s best interests to provide security 
and stability for the child.84 
A second-parent adoption permits a partner of the child’s 
biological or adoptive parent to adopt the child without terminating the 
first parent’s rights. If a state allows a second parent adoption, a same 
or opposite sex partner could adopt the child conceived by assisted 
reproduction. Only five statutes specifically allow a second parent 
adoption.85 Two thirds of the states either prohibit adoptions by same-
sex partners or do not have a case on point.86 While adoption solves 
 
 84. See Sharon S. v. Super. Ct. of San Diego, County, 73 P.3d 554 (Cal. 2003); In re 
Hart, 806 A.2d 1179 (Del. Fam. Ct. 2001); In re M.M.D. v. B.H.M., 662 A.2d 837 (D.C. 
1995); In re Petition of K.M. & D.M., 653 N.E.2d 888 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995); In re Adoption of 
K.S.P., 804 N.E.2d 1253 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004); Mariga v. Flint, 822 N.E.2d 620 (Ind. Ct. App. 
2005), trans. denied; In re Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315 (Mass. 1993); In re Adoption 
of Two Children by H.N.R., 666 A.2d 535 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995); In re Jacob, In re 
Dana, 660 N.E.2d 397 (N.Y. 1995); In re R.B.F. & R.C.F., 803 A.2d 1195 (Pa. 2002); In re 
B.L.V.B., 628 A.2d 1271 (Vt. 1993). See also In re Adoption of T.A.M., 791 N.W.2d 573 
(Minn. Ct. App. 2010) (refusing to vacate a second parent adoption on procedural grounds and 
not deciding the issue of whether Minnesota allows or not). But see M.S. v. C.S., 938 N.E.2d 
278 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (strictly construing the stepparent adoption statute to find same-partner 
was not a legal parent). 
 85. See e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 9000(b) (2010); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 19-5-203(1) 
(d.5), 19-5-208(5), 19-5-210(1.5), 19-5-211 (1.5); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 45a-724(a)(2) and (3); 
45a-731(5), (6) and (7); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW. §110 (McKinney 2010); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 
15A, § 1-102(b) (West 2010). See In re Adoption of Carolyn B., 774 N.Y.S.2d 227 (Sup. Ct. 
2004) (allowing two women to jointly adopt a child who was not biologically related to either 
party). 
 86. See Lynn D. Wardle, Comparative Perspectives on Adoption of Children by 
Cohabiting, Nonmarital Couples and Partners, 63 ARK. L. REV. 31, 47 n. 66, 98 (2010) (listing 
thirty three states as not allowing adoption by same-sex partners and couples). 
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the legal parentage issue, it seems like an expensive and unnecessary 
step. But otherwise, court action may be required, also an expensive 
step which may exceed the cost of adoption. 
The advantage of a second parent adoption is that it creates a 
judgment that is entitled to full faith and credit in other states.87 
Although the failure to adopt if the state allows it may work against 
legal recognition of the same-sex co-parent,88 from a child’s 
perspective, a formal adoption is irrelevant if the child has formed a 
psychological attachment to the person acting as a parent.  
 
E.  Equitable Powers of the Court 
 
From a child’s perspective it makes sense to treat sexual orientation 
and marital status as relevant only to the extent they bear on the 
capacity of the party seeking custody . . . to meet the child’s 
needs.89 
 
In the majority of states, courts have struggled to find ways to 
recognize a same-sex partner who has consented to the artificial 
insemination or surrogacy procedure.90 If children are to reap the 
benefit of having two parents, the law must fashion remedies to 
protect them. The consent of two persons to use of ART and co-parent 
creates an extraordinary circumstance that allows a state to use its 
parens patriae power to protect the emotional and financial interests of 
children in maintaining the parent-child relationship.91 Several courts 
 
 87. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. Accord Embry v. Ryan, 11 So. 3d 408 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 2009); Russell v. Bridgens, 647 N.W.2d 56 (Neb. 2002); See Finstuen v. Crutcher, 496 
F.3d 1130 (10th Cir. 2007) (finding that an Oklahoma statute that barred recognition of an 
adoption by a same-sex couple that is finalized in another state violated the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause). See also In re Adoption of Sebastian, 879 N.Y.S.2d 677 (Sur. Ct. 2009) (allowing a 
decree of adoption for couple who had same-sex marriage from Netherlands to ensure that both 
women would be recognized as legal parents of the child created from assisted reproduction). 
But see Oren Adar, et al. v. Darlene Smith, 2011 WL 1367493 (5th Cir. Apr. 12, 2011) (finding 
that two men did not state a §1983 claim against the Registrar of Vital Statistics who refused to 
change the Louisiana birth certificate of the child they adopted in New York). 
 88. See M.S. v. C.S., 938 N.E.2d 278 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (finding same sex partner 
who was de facto parent had not adopted child and therefore was not legal parent entitled to 
parenting time); Titchenal v. Dexter, 693 A.2d 682 (Vt. 1997) (finding partner’s failure to adopt 
child indicated lack of intent to be a legal parent). 
 89. Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, It All Depends on What You Mean by Home: Toward a 
Communitarian View of the Nontraditional Family, 1996 UTAH L. REV. 569, 610-11. 
 90. See generally Deborah L. Forman, Same-Sex Partners: Strangers, Third Parties or 
Parents? The Changing Legal Landscape and the Struggle for Parental Equality, 40 FAM. L.Q. 
23 (2006) (discussing problems with not recognizing parents in same-sex relationships); Barbara 
Bennett Woodhouse, Hatching the Egg: A Child-Centered Perspective on Parents’ Rights, 14 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1747 (1993). 
 91. Morrison v. Sadler, 821 N.E.2d 15, 24 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (discussing difference 
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have used principles of equitable estoppel, functional, de facto or 
intended parenthood principles to protect a child’s relationship with 
both parents, whether or not there was a formal legal relationship or a 
biological connection. 
 
1.  Equitable Estoppel 
 
Courts have applied the doctrine of equitable estoppel to prevent a 
parent from denying the parental status of a co-parent.92 The ALI’s 
Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution use estoppel to afford 
parental status to co-parents. Section 2.03(b)(iii) defines a “parent by 
estoppel” as one who: 
 
lived with the child since the child’s birth, holding out and accepting 
full and permanent responsibilities as parent, as part of a prior co-
parenting agreement with the child’s legal parent (or, if there are 
two legal parents, both parents) to raise a child together each with 
full parental rights and responsibilities, when the court finds that 
recognition of the individual as a parent is in the child’s best 
interests.93 
 
One of the earliest cases involved a husband who had consented to 
the artificial insemination of his wife, then claimed the child was not 
his biological child at the time of the divorce. The California court 
stated: “One who consents to the production of a child cannot create a 
temporary relation to be assumed and disclaimed at will.”94 In a later 
California case, the same-sex partners had obtained a stipulated 
judgment that they were “the joint intended legal parents” of the child 
and permitting identification of the nonbiological partner as a “parent” 
on the birth certificate in the space provided for “father.” When the 
couple separated, the biological parent sought to set aside the 
judgment. The court did not address whether the judgment was 
appropriate under the UPA, but concluded that the biological parent 
 
between natural reproduction and adoption or assisted reproduction). 
 92. L.S.K. v. H.A.N., 813 A.2d 872 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002) (affirming order of child 
support against lesbian co-parent who assisted in artificial insemination and jointly reared the 
resulting children); H.M. v. E.T., 14 N.Y.3d 511 (2010) (finding jurisdiction to entertain a child 
support petition by a biological mother seeking support from her former same sex partner on the 
assertion that the partner is the parent of the child). 
 93. ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 36, at §2.03(1)(b)(iii) (2002). The comments clarify that 
it does not require a formal, written agreement.  Id. at Comment b.iii. 
 94. People v. Sorenson, 437 P.2d 495, 499 (Cal. 1968) (ordering husband to pay child 
support). 
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was estopped from contesting the judgment she had sought.95 
The intended parent cases involve situations in which a couple 
chooses to have a child, either through adoption by one of the parents 
or assisted conception. These cases fit the mold of when equitable 
estoppel should be used.96 If one parent has adopted the child in a 
same-sex or heterosexual relationship, courts could recognize the other 
parent as a legal parent. The Montana Court of Appeals noted that 
“homosexuals in an intimate domestic relationship each have the right 
to parent the children they mutually agree that one party will adopt 
(or, presumably, conceive).”97 When two persons agree to and do 
produce or have a child and subsequently co-parent the child, the use 
of estoppel should provide for the child to continue a relationship with 
the nonbiological, non-legal parent unless it is not in the best interests 
of the child and to ensure that the child receives support.98 
The New York Court of Appeals used equitable estoppel 
principles to bar the child’s biological mother from denying the 
parental relationship of her former same-sex domestic partner. Even 
though the partner lacked standing under New York law to assert a 
right to custody or visitation, the court used the best interest of the 
child standard to maintain the established relationship between the 
parent and the child.99 
 
2.  Psychological or De Facto Parents 
 
Absent explicit statutory authority, courts have exercised equitable 
powers to protect a child’s relationship with an individual who has 
functioned as the child’s parent. A few states have used the concept of 
functional parenthood, which has been variously described as an 
individual acting in loco parentis, as a de facto parent, or as a 
 
 95. Kristine H. v. Lisa R., 117 P.3d 690 (Cal. 2005) (noting that to do otherwise would 
allow the parent to “trifle with the courts” and run afoul of the public policy in favor of two-
parent families). Id. at 693-696. 
 96. Davis v. Swan, 697 S.E.2d 473 (N.C. Ct. App. 2010). 
 97. Kulstad v. Maniaci, 220 P.3d 595, 612 (Mont. 2009). 
 98. Chambers v. Chambers, No. CN00-09493, 2002 WL 1940145, pg. 11 (Del. Fam. Ct. 
2002) (using equitable estoppel to impose a child support order on a same-sex partner who paid 
for the in vitro fertilization of her partner, co-parented the child and sought visitation when the 
relationship ended). See also Jacob v. Shulz-Jacob, 923 A.2d 473 (Pa. 2007) (using equitable 
estoppel to impose child support on a known sperm donor who had voluntarily provided some 
support and was actively involved in the children’s lives); In re LaPiana, 2010 WL 3042394 
(Ohio App., Aug. 5, 2010) (finding the law estopped biological mother from denying former 
partner shared custody when the two co-parented the children during and after the relationship 
ended). 
 99. Debra H. v. Janice R., 930 N.E.2d 184 (N.Y. 2010). 
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psychological parent, as a sufficient basis for granting complete 
parental status to same-sex co-parents.100 Some of these courts assert 
their parens patriae power to protect children. The Colorado Court of 
Appeals affirmed granting joint custody to the same-sex partner who 
had been functioning as a parent without a finding of parental 
unfitness of the adoptive parent. The court found that proof that “a fit 
parent’s exercise of parental responsibilities poses actual or threatened 
emotional harm to the child establishes a compelling state interest 
sufficient to permit state interference with parental rights.”101 The 
court further found that “emotional harm to a young child is intrinsic 
in the termination or significant curtailment of the child’s relationship 
with a psychological parent . . . .”102 
The Wisconsin Supreme Court first announced a four-pronged test 
to determine whether a nonbiological partner had a parent-like 
relationship with a child to allow the court to exercise its inherent 
equitable power to grant visitation, but not custody, over the objection 
of the biological parent. The factors are: 
 
(1) the legal parent consented to and fostered the nonparent’s 
formation and establishment of a parent-like relationship between the 
nonparent and the child; (2) the nonparent and the child lived 
together in the same household; (3) the nonparent assumed 
obligations of parenthood by taking significant responsibility for the 
child’s care, education and development, including contributing 
towards the child’s support, without expectation of financial 
compensation, and (4) the nonparent has established a parental role 
sufficient to create with the child a bonded, dependent relationship 
parental in nature.103 
 
 100. See Mullins v. Picklesimer, 317 S.W.3d 569 (Ky. 2010) (finding the biological 
mother had facilitated an emotional and psychological bond between her partner and the child); 
C.E.W. v. D.E.W., 845 A.2d 1146, 1147-50, 1151 (Me. 2004) (recognizing equal parental 
rights of a lesbian co-parent who was a de facto parent); J.A.L. v. E.P.H., 682 A.2d 1314 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1996) (finding that former domestic partner stood in loco parentis with child and had 
standing to seek partial custody); In re Parentage of L.B., 122 P.3d. 161, n. 7, 177 (Wash. 
2005) (distinguishing de facto parents from those who stand in loco parentis which describes 
individuals who parent temporarily in place of a legal parent and whose status can be terminated 
by the withdrawal of consent). 
 101. In re E.L.M.C., 100 P.3d 546, 558 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004), cert. denied (applying a 
statute granting standing to seek parental decision-making responsibilities to a person other than a 
parent who had been in physical care of the child for six months or more to a same sex partner 
where the other partner adopted a six-month-old child under China law, and both partners 
parented the child during their seven-year relationship). 
 102. Id. at 561. 
 103. In re H.S.H-K., 533 N.W.2d 419, 421, 435-36 (Wis. 1995) (allowing the non 
biological partner visitation over objection of biological parent and finding that parental 
autonomy and constitutional rights are protected by requiring that the parent-like relationship 
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The court added that: “This exercise of equitable power . . . 
protects a child’s best interest by preserving the child’s relationship 
with an adult who has been like a parent.”104 One court called the 
Wisconsin test as “[t]he most thoughtful and inclusive definition of de 
facto parenthood” and many have applied it.105 In allowing a 
nonbiological same-sex partner standing to seek legal custody and 
visitation, the New Jersey Supreme Court noted: 
 
At the heart of the psychological parent cases is a recognition that 
children have a strong interest in maintaining the ties that connect 
them to adults who love and provide for them. That interest, for 
constitutional as well as social purposes, lies in the emotional bonds 
that develop between family members as a result of shared daily 
life.106 
 
The consent of the biological or adoptive parent is the key 
allowing a finding of a psychological parent. When the legal parent 
consents and encourages the formation of a parent-child relationship 
between her child and the nonbiological parent, judicial 
acknowledgment of the relationship does not infringe upon the 
biological parent’s constitutional rights. The court can look at the 
harm to the child if the relationship is unilaterally severed.107 
Some have used the psychological parent test to provide full 
parental rights. For example, the Washington Supreme Court 
recognized the parental status of a former same-sex partner as a 
common law de facto parent who stood in legal parity with the mother 
so custody and visitation were determined under the best interests of 
the child standard.108Allowing parental rights to a psychological or de 
facto parent based on the best interests of the child does not infringe 
on the legal or biological parent’s constitutionally protected interest in 
 
develop only with the consent and assistance of the biological or adoptive parent). 
 104. Id. at 436. 
 105. V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539, 551 (N.J. 2000), cert. denied sub nom 531 U.S. 926. 
See also Middleton v. Johnson, 633 S.E.2d 162, 168 (S.C. Ct. App. 2006) (finding four factors 
ensure limited number of persons will be psychological parents); Rubano v. DiCenzo, 759 A.2d 
959, 974 (R.I. 2000); In re Parentage of L.B., 122 P.3d. 161, 176 (Wash. 2005). 
 106. V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d at 550. 
 107. Id. at 549-50, 553-54; Rubano v. DiCenzo, 759 A.2d 959, 974 (R.I. 2000) (finding 
consent of legal parent protects against claims by individuals not functioning as parents); In re 
Parentage of L.B., 122 P.3d. 161,179 (Wash. 2005) (noting that the State is not interfering on 
behalf of a third party in an insular family unit but is enforcing the rights and obligations of 
parenthood that attach to de facto parents). 
 108. In re Parentage of  L.B., 122 P.3d. at 173, 177 (noting de facto parenthood status is 
limited to nonparents who have fully and completely undertaken a permanent, unequivocal, 
committed, and responsible parental role in the child’s life). 
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respecting the parent-child relationship because the parent has 
voluntarily chosen to yield parental control to the partner.109 
Courts in approximately a dozen states have allowed partners 
standing to seek visitation, but these rights are generally not as 
extensive as physical custody.110 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
used the doctrine of in loco parentis to grant a lesbian co-parent 
standing to seek visitation, but the partner had the burden of 
overcoming the presumption in favor of the biological parent.111 In 
Massachusetts the court exercised its equitable power to protect the 
best interests of the child in continuing her relationship with a de facto 
parent by ordering visitation with the child’s lesbian co-parent112 and 
finding a “minimal intrusion” on the biological parent’s superior 
rights.113 In some states, however, even if the child was produced by 
ART during the relationship and the non-biological partner is a de 
facto parent, the court may deny parenting time because of lack of 
legal status as a parent.114 
 
 109. Id. at 179. See also C.E.W. v. D.E.W., 845 A.2d 1146, 1147-1150, 52 (2004) 
(recognizing the “unusual and significant parent-like role” that the functional parent played and 
placing her in legal parity with an otherwise legal parent). See also Mullins v. Picklesimer, 317 
S.W.3d 569 (Ky. 2010); Mason v. Dwinnell, 660 S.E.2d 58, 69 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008) (applying 
the best interest standard because the legal parent acted inconsistently with her constitutional 
rights by allowing a third party to function as a parent to her child); Middleton v. Johnson, 633 
S.E.2d 162 (S.C. Ct. App. 2006) (noting that when a legal parent invites a third party into a 
child’s life and provides the child with essentially another parent, “the legal parent’s rights to 
unilaterally sever that relationship are necessarily reduced.”). 
 110. See Thomas v. Thomas, 49 P.3d 306 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2002); Laspina-Williams v. 
Laspina-Williams, 742 A.2d 840 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1999); King v. S.B., 837 N.E.2d 965 (Ind. 
2005); S.F. v. M.D., 751 A.2d 9 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2000); E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 711 N.E.2d 
886 (Mass. 1999); SooHoo v. Johnson, 731 N.W.2d 815, 818, 824 (Minn. 2007); LaChapelle v. 
Mitten, 607 N.W.2d 151 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000); Kulstad v. Maniaci, 220 P.3d 595 (Mont. 
2009); Mason v. Dwinnell, 660 S.E.2d 58, 65 (N.C. Ct. App.2008); Middleton v. Johnson, 633 
S.E.2d 162 (S.C. Ct. App. 2006); In re H.S.H-K., 533 N.W.2d 419 (Wis. 1995); A.C. v. C.B., 
829 P.2d 660 (N.M. Ct. App. 1992); Cf. Clifford K. v. Paul S., 619 S.E.2d 138, 153-54 (W. 
Va. 2005) (finding partner had standing to intervene in custody proceeding after biological 
mother’s death under “exceptional cases” provision). 
 111. T.B. v. L.R.M., 786 A.2d 913, 917, 919 (Pa. 2001) (holding former same-sex 
partner who assumed a parental status and duties with the biological mother’s consent standing to 
seek visitation if it was in the child’s best interests to maintain the relationship). The American 
Law Institute distinguishes a de facto parent from a parent by estoppel. ALI PRINCIPLES, supra 
note 36, at § 2.03(1)(b)(iv) (defining a de facto parent as one who has not lived with the child 
since birth but has lived together for at least two years and assumed full parental responsibility 
with the agreement of the legal parent. The de facto parent is presumptively entitled to some 
share of custodial time but not the majority). 
 112. E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 711 N.E.2d 886, 891 (Mass. 1999) (defining a de facto parent as 
one who lives with the child and assumes caretaking functions “at least as great as the legal 
parent” with the consent and encouragement of the legal parent). 
 113. Id. at 893. 
 114. M.S. v. C.S., 938 N.E.2d 278 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (noting, however, that even if 
former partner was not automatically precluded from obtaining visitation rights, visitation was 
not in child’s best interests where partner threw objects at mother, threatened mother’s life in 
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 IV.  DEFINING PARENTS BY INTENTION - CONTRACTS AND ART  
 
[I]t seems to follow both logically and pragmatically that if a couple 
in a nontraditional family relationship cooperates to bring a child 
into existence by such technologies as in vitro fertilization, they 
should both be responsible for supporting the child.115 
 
The intention to become a co-parent can be shown by conduct and 
contract. The combination of contracts and intention to create and rear 
a child should be sufficient to create the status of “parent” if a child is 
born and the parties do co-parent.116 The California Supreme Court 
first applied the intent test when a husband and wife contributed 
genetic material and a surrogate carried the child to term, finding that 
“[s]he who intended to bring about the birth of a child that she 
intended to raise as her own - is the natural mother . . . .”117 The 
court extended the concept to find that when a married couple intends 
to procreate using a non-genetically related embryo implanted into a 
surrogate, the intended parents are the legal parents of the child so 
created.118 The California Supreme Court extended the “intent” 
concept beyond the married couple situation to find that a child could 
have two mothers.119 
Other courts have looked at the intentions of the parties to create a 
child. The Tennessee Supreme Court found that both genetics and 
parenting intent are relevant in determining parenthood. It found that a 
 
front of child, and actions were so threatening that six-year-old child tried to intervene by 
holding onto partner and asking mother to leave). 
 115. ART: A LAWYER’S GUIDE, supra note 39, at 109. 
 116. See Marjorie Maguire Shultz, Reproductive Technology and Intent-Based Parenthood: 
An Opportunity for Gender Neutrality, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 297, 323 (arguing that “intentions 
that are voluntarily chosen, deliberate, express and bargained for ought presumptively to 
determine legal parenthood.”).  See also Richard F. Storrow, Parenthood by Pure Intention: 
Assisted Reproduction and the Functional Approach to Parentage, 53 HASTINGS L. J. 597, 597 
(2002); Nancy G. Maxwell & Caroline J. Forder, The Inadequacies in U.S. and Dutch Adoption 
Law to Establish Same-Sex Couples as Legal Parents: A Call for Recognizing Intentional 
Parenthood, 38 FAM. L. Q. 623 (2004). 
 117. Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 782 (Cal. 1993) (holding that genetic mother of a 
child born through use of a gestational surrogate was the “natural” mother). 
 118. In re Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rtpr. 280, 284 (Ct. App. 1998) (finding that the husband 
who with his wife contracted with a surrogate to carry a child conceived with donor sperm and 
donor egg could not escape the obligation to pay child support). 
 119. Elisa B. v. Superior Ct. of El Dorado Cty, 117 P.3d 660, 666-67, 670 (Cal. 2005) 
(finding the non biological mother of twins born to partner during relationship to be a legal 
parent with the obligation to pay child support when both partners were artificially inseminated at 
the same time, gave the resulting children a hyphenated last name, and breast fed and parented 
each other’s children.); K.M. v. E.G., 117 P.3d 673 (Cal. 2005) (finding both women to be 
legal parents where they had twins together through ovum sharing with an egg removed from 
one, fertilized in vitro, and implanted in the partner). 
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woman who gave birth to triplets through IVF using eggs from an 
anonymous donor and sperm from her unmarried partner was the 
children’s legal mother based on her intention to assume parental 
responsibility and her gestational role.120 As noted, the UPA presumes 
maternity by virtue of birth. 
The concept of intended parenthood for a child conceived by ART 
can have even more importance for a couple who cannot marry, form 
a civil union, or have a second parent adoption. These couples often 
enter into contracts expressing the intent to have a child and co-parent 
followed by use of ART procedures.121 
Once created, the law should protect the child’s parent–child 
relationships. The law can protect the relation best by legally 
recognizing both intentional parents from the time the child is born.122 
Connecticut recently allowed a declaratory judgment to determine that 
two male partners were the legal parents of a child, rather than the 
gestational surrogate.123 The Ontario Court of Appeals went beyond 
recognizing two parents by finding both lesbian partners and the male 
sperm donor were parents.124 In the unwed parent context, there are 
procedures for voluntary acknowledgments of paternity. The law could 
provide for similar acknowledgments in assisted reproduction cases. If 
the Uniform Parentage Act term “paternity” were changed to 
“parentage,” voluntarily acknowledgments could work for same-sex 
couples or other nontraditional parenting relationships. 
Some states appear to endorse the use of contract principles in 
cases of assisted reproduction. In Kansas, the absence of a written 
agreement between a biological mother and a sperm donor meant that 
 
 120. In re C.K.G., 173 S.W.3d 714 (Tenn. 2005). 
 121. In re LaPiana, 2010 WL 3042394 (Ohio App. Aug. 5, 2010) (finding that the two 
women had planned for and paid for pregnancy, the partner was present at birth and her name 
was on the birth certificate, the partners jointly cared for the child, held themselves out and acted 
as a family, the partner’s will listed the other as the child’s guardian, the parent executed a 
general durable health care power of attorney, and after separation, they agreed to support each 
other as parents and did co-parent); Mullins v. Picklesimer, 317 S.W.3d 569 (Ky. 2010) (noting 
the parties cared for the child from birth, biological mother had encouraged, fostered, and 
facilitated an emotional and psychological bond between the child and parent); C.E.W. v. 
D.E.W., 845 A.2d 1146, 1147-50, 52 (2004) (finding the former same-sex partner to be a 
functional parent because she lived with the mother, agreed to conceive a child, and signed two 
co-parenting agreements stating their intentions to have equal rights and responsibilities.). 
 122. See Mary Patricia Byrn & Jenni Vainik Ives, Which Came First The Parent or the 
Child? 62 RUTGERS L. REV. 305 (2010) arguing that children have a constitutional right to have 
legal parents named at birth); James G. Dwyer, A Constitutional Birthright: The State, 
Parentage, and the Rights of Newborn Persons, 56 UCLA L. REV. 755 (2009). 
 123. Raftopol v. Ramey, 12 A.3d 783 (Conn. 2011). See also In re Roberta D.B., 923 
A.2d 115 (Md. C. App. 2007) (allowing biological father who used a gestational surrogate to be 
listed alone on the birth certificate). 
 124. A.A. v. B.B., 83 O.R.3d 561 (2007). 
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the sperm donor had no rights.125 The court indicated that the writing 
requirement to give a sperm donor rights “enhances predictability, 
clarity, and enforceability.”126 The same argument could be applied to 
partners who chose to create parenting relationships through ART (or 
one parent adoption). The biological parent’s consent to the creation of 
the parent-child relationship with the partner is a critical waiver of the 
biological parent’s constitutionally-protected exclusive right to 
parenthood. That consent is the boundary distinguishing true parent-
like persons from grandparents, caretakers, other third parties or legal 
strangers, who do not deserve parental rights or responsibilities.127 
These private contracts can set out the intention of the parties to agree 
to conceive a child, to act as co-parents with equal rights and 
responsibilities, to address obligations between the parties, and to 
authorize certain actions. These documents can include a power of 
attorney, medical decision-making forms, and wills, providing 
inheritance rights. In addition, the parties may set out what should 
happen if the relationship ends and how parenting will be determined. 
These contracts, like separation agreements or parenting plans of 
divorcing or separating parents, address what the intended parents 
believe is in the best interest of their child and should be 
presumptively valid. Enforcing these contracts protects the children 
from the harm of losing emotional and financial support and provides 
clarity and predictability. 
Contracts, however, do not bind third parties, do not affect the 
government’s grant of benefits, and therefore, are not equal to a grant 
of positive rights. In addition, some courts declare such agreements 
unenforceable as a matter of public policy, reasoning that the law does 
not allow “parenthood by contract.”128 Other courts have occasionally 
viewed the existence of a co-parenting agreement as an indirect basis 
for affording parental rights but have not reached that result by 
enforcing the contract itself.129 Some courts have been willing to 
 
 125. In re K.M.H., 169 P.3d 1025 (Kan. 2007). 
 126. Id. at 1039. 
 127. See V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539, 552 (N.J. 2000) cert denied sub nom 531 U.S. 
926 (requiring the legal parent’s consent to the creation of the partner’s relationship with the 
child “is critical because it makes the biological or adoptive parent a participant in the creation 
of the psychological parent’s relationship with the child. Without such a requirement, a paid 
nanny or babysitter could theoretically qualify for parental status.”). 
 128. T.F. v. B.L., 813 N.E.2d 1244, 1250-51 (Mass. 2004) (finding implied agreement 
between mother and partner unenforceable and refusing to invoke equitable powers to order 
partner to support child); Wakeman v. Dixon, 921 So. 2d 669 (Fla. 2006); Janis C. v. Christine 
T., 742 N.Y.S.2d 381 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002). 
 129. E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 711 N.E.2d 886, 892 n.10 (Mass. 1999) (viewing the existence 
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enforce settlement agreements entered into by same-sex parents, if 
sanctioned by the court.130 
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 
The denomination of children’s associational interests as ‘right’ 
might lead some judges to give greater credence to the emotional 
losses suffered by children when important familial bonds are 
severed.131 
 
Protecting the child means considering the reality of the child’s 
life and experience.132 While I agree that “responsible parenthood” is 
one the “root paradigms” of society,133 an adherence to strict legal or 
biological definitions of a parent denies the child access to one of the 
persons who, in the child’s reality, is the child’s parent. The lack of 
legal recognition probably will not keep same-sex couples or others 
from using ART. No useful purpose is served if the child is deprived 
of the love and support of the second person who intended to be, and 
who has acted, as a parent. Indeed, only a severe negative is achieved 
if a child of assisted conception, or adopted by one partner, does not 
receive the same level of protection as other children. To the extent 
that family law protects individuals within the family unit, a child 
conceived by ART should be found to have a recognized constitutional 
right to maintain a relationship with both “parents.” 
As a dissenting New Mexico judge stated when the majority 
determined that a same sex partner who acted as a parent for nine 
years had no right to seek declaration of parenthood or legal custody 
 
of a written co-parenting agreement as demonstrative of the biological mother’s consent to and 
encouragement of the plaintiff’s de facto parental relationship with the child, as well as indicative 
of the parties’ belief regarding the child’s best interests). See also C.E.W. v. D.E.W., 845 A.2d 
1146, 1147, 1151 (Me. 2004) (observing parties’ signed parenting agreement shortly after child’s 
birth and again after separation; agreement provided further evidence of mother’s admission that 
partner was de facto parent). 
 130. In re Bonfield, 780 N.E.2d 241, 249 (Ohio 2002) (finding shared parenting agreement 
between the biological mother and her same-sex partner could be enforceable, as long as it was 
in the best interests of the children); A.C. v. C.B., 829 P.2d 660, 664 (N.M. Ct. App. 1992) 
(finding a settlement agreement providing for shared parental rights and responsibilities initially 
entered into upon the birth of the child and honored after the separation could be enforceable). 
 131. David D. Meyer, The Modest Promise of Children’s Relationship Rights, 11 WM. & 
MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 1117, 1137 (2003). 
 132. Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, supra note 90, at 1809-10 (discussing legal obstacles 
faced by nonparent caregiver seeking to regain or retain custody against wishes of a biological 
parent, saying: “[a]lthough giving lip service to children’s interests, [courts] fail to reflect 
children’s experience of reality.”). 
 133. Lynn D. Wardle, Parenthood and the Limits of Adult Autonomy, 24 ST. L. U. PUB. 
L. REV. 169, 178 (2005). 
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of the child: 
 
The child is helpless with the most to lose in this case: a loving, 
nurturing parent. Petitioner asks for her day in court where she can 
seek to have her rights and duties as a parent of the child confirmed. 
In concluding Petitioner has no standing to be heard, the majority 
negates years of jurisprudence which recognizes the realities of a 
parent-child relationship, and the child’s interest in her right to a 
parent.134 
 
Where assisted reproduction is used to produce a child by 
agreement of the partners, both should be considered parents of the 
child. The consent of both partners to creation of the child waives 
one’s superior rights based on a genetic or legal connection and best 
protects a child’s rights to financial and emotional support. A child-
centered approach does not deprive the child of a person the child 
considers a parent because of the status of the adults. 
 
 
 134. Chatterjee v. King, --- P.3d ----, 2010 WL 5783011 (N.M. Ct. App. Dec. 1, 2010). 
